THE
LIMITS OF AUTHORITY OVER KNOWLEDGE:
JACQUES DERRIDA ON
LANGUAGE
Introduction
Most of us care about reality. Although
many may not explicitly express it, this sense of concern is evident in the way
we care about anything that has significance to us. Insofar as we have this
caring, the importance of reality is inevitable. For example, if we care about
our education, part and parcel of this caring is the belief that education is
real. Moreover, we care about reality because it is the very characteristic of
the things we give importance. If God is important for us, it is because we see
God as real. The same is true with passion, morality, belief in ghosts or even
the little tiny bee one rescues near the river. We may not be conscious of it,
but because we believe in those things we also believe that they are real.
Since
we care about reality, many people take it an imperative to have the absolute
knowledge about it. Reality is what justifies our caring, and if we do not know
what reality is then it implies that we are not justified in our caring. There
is an existential exigence that impedes us to search for a justification of our
belief in reality which is the soul of our caring. If I believe in God, I must
have justification in treating God as real; that is, I must know God. If others
would laugh at me because of my belief, it would never affect me because I know
that God is real, and they don’t. The same also is true with all other beliefs
like beliefs in freedom, peace, justice or in things we see every day. In other words, there is a call of
conscientiousness to know what we believe.
This
is perhaps the reason why philosophy exists – to know reality. In the course of
time, many people especially philosophers attempt to give a definite conception
of what reality is. However, none of them succeeds in giving to all people a
satisfying definition. This is why there are many schools of thought and even
fields of inquiries which also take the same venture. Even then, human beings
still continue to search for knowledge.
The
author in this paper believes about this necessity. However, human beings’
fragmented conceptions of reality seem to give the author a thought that
absolute knowledge is hard to reach. He finds it problematic to reconcile all
beliefs which are sometimes in conflict. Can one’s belief about reality be truer
than the other beliefs? If this is true, then all of us must indeed glorify
only one belief. However, can we really do that? If I am a Christian, can I
impose my belief in Christ to my Muslim brothers and sisters, or can I treat
their belief as absurd and nonsense? Do I have the authority of knowledge?
It is then necessary to ask: “Do we
have the authority of claiming the truth, the absolute knowledge?” Jacques
Derrida, a well known French philosopher in the twentieth century, would say “no”.
Through his analysis of language, Derrida has shown how the assumption that one
belief is better than the other is futile and baseless.
This
paper intends to fathom the thought of this influential philosopher. It hopes
to contribute something for a reassessment and reevaluation of most of our
beliefs on which we tend to ground our judgment to other people. It seeks to
answer the following questions:
1. What
is Derrida’s notion on language?
2. How
does Derrida respond to the authoritarian claims for knowledge?
3. What
are the insights we can get from Derrida’s philosophy especially in our
endeavor for learning?
Short Background
Jacques Derrida was born in Algeria in
1930 of a Jewish descent. His childhood education was not of good treatment due
to his being a Jewish native. Algeria at that time was a colony of France, and
the French government was implementing anti-Semitism promulgation. Nevertheless,
this did not prevent him from realizing his interest in philosophy. He was nineteen
years old when his family sent him to Paris in order to attain higher education
in the most prestigious academe there – Ecole Normale. His ingenuity, however,
did not pass the school’s standard, and he had to repeat taking entrance
examination thrice. Only in the third attempt did he pass and became a bonafide
student of that school. Yet, after years of study, Derrida had proven himself
to be intellectually gifted. He turned to be the leading intellectual novice in
his school, mastering the works of Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and many others.
His effectiveness as a student gave him the chance to become a visiting student
in Harvard for one year. He was the best friend of Michel Foucault, who is also
a famous French philosopher.
Ten years after his graduation, he was
invited to become a professor of Ecole Normale to teach Philosophy and
Literature. From this time onward, Derrida began to develop his own
philosophical enterprise that had brought him to the summit of his intellectual
career. Eventually, his works became known throughout Europe. Beginning in the 1960s, he held many
appointments for lectures in various American Universities like John Hopkins, Yale
and University of California. He died in 2002 because of pancreatic cancer,
leaving his beloved wife and two sons.
His reputation as a philosopher is
brought about by his radical bearing on language, challenging the basic assumptions
that had so long dominated Western culture. Today, many intellectuals associate
his name with deconstructionism or post-structuralism which we will know later.
Some of his famous books are Of
Grammatology (1972) and Writing and
Difference (1978).
The Postmodern Culture
Derrida worked in an atmosphere where
intellectual dissatisfaction to authoritarian claim for truth was prominent.
Postmodernism rose to challenge various doctrines that claim to possess the
absolute truth. We can point this origin from the advent of the most radical
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche who pronounced the death of God. Postmodernism
held the view that truth cannot be possessed by a one doctrine and that reality
is not “a solid, self contained given but a fluid, unfolding process, an open
universe” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 397). Ironically,
Derrida was not only influenced by this environment but his philosophy also influenced
the development of this skeptical thought.s
One of the main tenets of the
postmodern thought is the notion that human understanding and conception of
reality is brought about by concept and symbol formation. In other words, human
beings form and understand concepts through the use of language. All human
knowledge, accordingly, “is mediated by signs and symbols” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 399).
This notion has prompted postmodern philosophers to look not on the concepts
that have shaped human thought throughout history but to the signs and symbols
that are instruments in the formation of knowledge. Thus, of the many factors
that contributed to the radical and skeptical currents of the postmodern
period, it has been the analyses of language that have converged much to
produce this intellectual position. Jacques Derrida, in the mainstream, is one
of those philosophers who shed light of this development. In fact, it has been
Jacques Derrida who initiated the plausible argument that destroys the common
notion that language is the authentic medium that would provide us the assurance
of meaning and reality.
Structuralism
Since the time when the analysis of language invaded the
philosophical atmosphere, various philosophers began to concern themselves not
on “what words say but how words say” (Powell, 1998, p. 99). While, for
example, an existentialist philosopher says “Existence precedes Essence”,
philosophers of language on the other hand ask: “Does
existence-precedes-essence really mean existence precedes essence?” In other
words there is now a transition from the analysis of reality and being to the
analysis of language that makes the concepts about reality and being.
In the history of philosophy before the time of postmodern
era there is a dominant assumption about language called logocentrism which
finds its root in Aristotle’s philosophy. Accordingly, logocentrism is an
assumption that “language represents presence” (Holcombe, 2007). This means
that there is always an outside factor that language is representing. For
example, to represent chair, we have the word “chair”. To represent Peter who
is an actual person, we have the name “Peter”. To represent God, we have the word
“God”. Hence, even if I do not see God around, the word “God” substitutes his
presence. Later, we will know how philosophers of language, especially Derrida,
respond to this assumption.
One theory which follows the doctrine of logocentrism is
structuralism. Structuralism is a linguistic theory that looks not to the
concepts made through language but to the structure of language per se. Its
champion, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), posits that a word or a sign has
two elements: the signifier (the physical manifestation) and the signified (the
mental concept, the meaning) (Moore & Bruder, 2008, p.186). The word
“chair”, for example, is not only a word but also a mental concept. Saussure
stresses that a signifier is inseparable
with the signified. This means that if there is a word or a sign, there must be
something that the word or sign refers. For instance, the Statue of Liberty
represents democracy; the word “Peter” represents Peter. Saussure further argues that we only
understand a word in relation and in contrast with other words; so that, when
we say “Peter” we cannot mean “John”. Thus, I know a “chair” in relation and in
contrast with “table”, “lamp”, “book” and with all the words in the language
system. Jacques Derrida modifies this concept to justify his argument about
language. Nevertheless, he also sees the incongruence of Saussure’s argument.
Jacques Derrida and
Post-structuralism
Derrida questions
the dominant doctrine of logocentrism. If logocentrism is true that language represents
something that is present, then how come we can attribute multiple meanings to
words? Does that mean that a word represents many presences? Moreover, if
language represents presence, how come we have words such as “nothing”,
“absence” and “non-being”? Do these words represent presence too? If these
words do not represent presence, can we say that these words are meaningless?
Derrida has known
very well the dominant notion of the inseparability of the signifier and the
signified, of the word and its meaning. “For the signification ‘sign’ has
always been comprehended and determined, in its sense, as sign-of, signifier
referring to a signified” (Derrida, 1978, p. 280). However, Derrida denounces
this relationship. He writes in his Of
Grammatology (1976, p. 73):
That the signified is originally and essentially trace, that it is
always already in the position of the signifier, is the apparently innocent
proposition within which the metaphysics of the logos, of presence and
consciousness, must reflect it as its death and its source.
By this, he means that structuralism contradicts its own assumption
that the meaning is always already in the signifier – already in the word. He
utilizes the structuralist concept of signs, but he posits that words do not
speak their own but instead speak other
words. “He proposes that a signifier does not necessarily refer to a single
signified but instead refer to other signifiers which in turn would refer to
others signifiers” (Gripaldo, 2008, p.46). For him, we cannot understand a word
without the help of other words. A word necessarily refers to other words and
not to what it represents.
We have this situation:
an inquisitive child sees a chair and asks Peter “What is that?” and Peter
answers “a chair”. If we accept the Derridian notion, then it means that Peter’s
answer does not refer to that actual thing the child sees. How can that be? Nevertheless,
we must understand that mental concepts are not only expressed in words but are
also formulated through words. The reason that Peter’s answer does not refer to
that actual thing the child saw is because Peter’s answer refers rather on the meaning of that actual thing. We must
note that we can only grasp meaning because of language – of words. This means
that the inquisitive child implicitly knew already the meaning of that thing
the moment the she saw it, and Peter’s answer was just referring to that
meaning. Still, we can have doubts to this notion. In the first place, the
reason why the child asked “What is that?” is because the child did not know
that it was chair.
However, Derrida would
ask: “What would “chair” connote?” Can we contain the thing’s being into our
language? Can the word “chair” really represent that thing which the child saw?
To be clear, let us go back to the situation.
We mentioned there that
the child saw a thing which Peter named “chair”. However, we have not mentioned
about the state of that thing the moment the child saw it. Let us suppose that
the thing that the child sees is something being held by a man who was using it
to kill another man. Grown-ups understand chair as something used for sitting.
However, when Peter said that it was a chair, the child understood it as
something used for killing and not something used for sitting. Hence, the word
“chair” refers to the meaning, and essence is only conceivable through language.
This implies that the things we know in this world are understood by meaning and not by actuality.
Derrida posits that there is something in that actual thing (that
chair) that cannot be represented totally by our language. We always want to
understand, and that’s why we try to grasp the meaning of it. However, this
very meaning is not understood because of that actual thing, of that signified
object, but because of other words.
The meanings of these other words in
turn are only grasped because of other words, extending to the infinite number
of words.
Derrida (1978, p. 289) expresses
this complexity by this statement:
The movement of signification adds something, which results in the
fact that there is always more, but this addition is a floating one because it
comes to perform a vicarious function, to supplement a lack on the part of the
signified.
By this, he means that for us to understand a thing we supplement it with words. These words,
however, are also supplemented with
other words.
Because a
signifier only refers to other signifiers, this allows signs to have multiple
meanings. This is why even if the word “chair” is understood to refer to
something which is used for sitting, it also means a position in an office. There
can never be a stable meaning because a word or a sign rests on other words. There
is no single signified which can own
the word. The moment a word is uttered or written, it would always be subject
to contain multiple meanings. Another reason why words have multiple meanings
can be found in the history of how words are made.
When a word is
invented, this entails that it already contains meaning. Once the inventor
grasps what she wants to mean, she contains this meaning in the word she would
make. Let us hypothetically situate this with Peter inventing the word “chair”.
Before Peter came up with the word “chair”, he already had the understanding of
the meaning he wanted to express. (In connection with the first situation,
Peter and the child understand “chair’ differently). Now, we would ask: “How
did he form the meaning he wanted to express prior to his making of the word?”
Is it not because of other words also? For instance, before Peter invented the
word “chair” he must have had thought first about its meaning – that it is “something
used for sitting”, which primarily are understood through “words”. One cannot
make a new word out of nothing. It must be based with the words already at
hand. Derrida (1978, p. 284) calls this concept bricolage:
The bricoleur…is someone who uses "the means at
hand," that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him,
those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an
eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by
trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it
appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and
their origin are heterogenous -- and so forth… There is therefore a critique of
language in the form of bricolage.
Derrida says there could never be
a person who would be the absolute origin of word. If there would be, then that
person might be equated with God. “A subject who would
supposedly be the absolute origin of his own discourse and would supposedly
construct it "out of nothing," "out of whole cloth," would
be the creator of the verbe, the verbe itself” (Derrida, 1978, p
285). Human as we are, it is impossible for us to track the very beginning of our
language.
Hence if this is
the case, implicit already in a particular word are also other words. This
concept is illustrated below:
We can look at this illustration in two direction: from to top to
bottom and from bottom to top. From to top to bottom we see that the word
(D123) has the implicit meanings and connotations of the other words where it
was derived. From bottom to top we see that the word (D123) is actually made
out of the previous words. This “originary complexity”, to use Derrida’s term,
is the structure of language. Moreover,
the words (A1), (B2), and (C3) and all other words where the concepts of word
(D123) are derived also have the same structure like that of word (D123). This
looks like this:
Derrida (1978, p. 167) summarizes this complexity by this crucial
question: “Must not structure have genesis, and must not genesis, the point of structure,
be already structured in order to be the genesis of something?” He means here that
there can never be a structure, a word, without an origin, and that origin must
also be structured, i.e. it must become a word, so that it can become the
origin of something.
Fixing the free
play of Signifiers
If language is so complex like this, then how come that we have a
particular meaning of the word? How can we understand a particular something,
i.e. a particular meaning, if words have multiple meanings?
Let us suppose first that we grasp the meaning of the word, say,
“rational” with the aid of other signifiers. The word “rational” refers to the
words “being”, “endowed”, “with”, and “reason”, and these words are arranged
respectively in this structure: “being-endowed-with-reason”. Let us assume that
we have understood the meaning of the word “rational” because of that
structure. “Being endowed with reason” provides us the necessary connotation of
the word “rational”. However, if we try to change the structure such that we
interchange the words “being” and “endowed”, we would apparently see a
different connotation. We therefore notice that there must be a fixed structure
of signifiers in order for us to understand the meaning of the word “rational”.
Moreover, each word in the structure must also have a fixed structure. For
example, the word “reason” can connote either “intellectual faculty” or
“justification”. Yet, for the word “reason” to coherently relate with other
words in the structure “being endowed with reason” in order to connote
“rational”, it must be understood as “intellectual faculty”. If we understand
“reason” as “justification”, then we apparently cannot understand the structure
as having the meaning of “rational”.
What does this imply? We are aware that a word can have multiple
meanings. In the previous section, we have stressed that a word has multiple
meanings because of two reasons: it refers to other signifiers which in turn
also refer to other signifiers; and, it is derived from other words which also
have multiple meanings. Now if words are understood to have multiple meanings,
it is absurd to say that when we speak or write something, we mean all the
multiple meanings. For example, when I say “You are so beautiful, you look like
a Christmas tree”, the word “beautiful” here does not have the same meaning as
the word “beautiful” in this sentence: “She is so beautiful in her white
dress.” Therefore, when we say or write something, we assume a particular
meaning. This is much true in discourses. Aristotle cannot assume to express
different meanings in the words he use. Otherwise, he himself will not
understand his philosophy. This implies then that when we assume to mean a
particular something, we also fix the free play of signifiers (Derrida,
1978).
Fixing the free play of signifiers means that we do not allow words in
discourses to express multiple meanings. If words are allowed to connote
multiple meanings, there would never be understanding between people. However,
we have to take note that fixing the free play of signifiers is not an activity
that a speaker or an author is conscious about; hence, it is assumption. The author
in this paper, for example, assumes that the words in this discourse have their
own particular meaning. At the very moment the author is writing, he is not
conscious about his activity of fixing the free play of signifiers. It’s only
when he takes a pause and reviews his work that he begins to think about this
activity. The reader, however, has all the powers to see the assumption that
the researcher is having.
Since the speaker or the author fixes the free play of signifiers, we
are led to the inference that somehow the speaker or the author sees or
considers one meaning only out of the multiple meanings that the words possess.
It is like seeing just one phase of the word. We see this analogy in the
parable of the four blind men and an elephant:
A group of
blind men heard that a strange animal, called an elephant, had been brought to
the town, but none of them were aware of its shape and form. Out of curiosity,
they said: "We must inspect and know it by touch, of which we are
capable". So, they sought it out, and when they found it they groped about
it. In the case of the first person, whose hand landed on the trunk, said
"This being is like a drain pipe". For another one whose hand reached
its ear, it seemed like a kind of fan. As for another person, whose hand was
upon its leg, said, "I perceive the shape of the elephant to be like a
pillar". And in the case of the one who placed his hand upon its back
said, "Indeed, this elephant is like a throne". Now, each of these
presented a true aspect when he related what he had gained from experiencing
the elephant. None of them had strayed from the true description of the
elephant.
The elephant is
the word, the blind men are the users of the word, and touching is the activity
of using the word. There is just one word, yet there are multiple meanings in
the way users touch it.
Many critics of Derrida misinterpret
him with this concept. At the first instance, we would notice that somehow we could
attribute to words whatever meaning we want
to express. Hence, it would be valid that I would connote “rational” to be a
kind of “soft-drink.” This is the wrong interpretation of him. In the first
place it would be absurd to use words
that could not express what we want to mean. (The reader must notice that the
emphasis here is on the usage of the speaker or the author and not on the comprehension
or the reader or the listener). He
maintains that it is not because we want to impose
meaning that makes the word meaningful but because implicit in the word is the infinite
number of signifiers (Holcombe, 2007). The
reason why we can attribute a word to any other words (meanings) in our
language is because there is a network of relationship of all signifiers in the
language system. All signifiers are related and connected with each other. This
means that the word has the infinite number of signifiers as its potency. This
is like saying that “a speck of dust mirrors the universe.”
Is fixing the free play significant?
Apparently, it is significant. Without fixing the free play of signifiers, apprehension
will not be possible. We cannot claim that we do not know anything because the
moment we say something about such agony we already know something; and that something
is language. Hence, we cannot go away with fixing the free play of signifiers
simply because we use words, and using words entails we understand those words.
Understanding words means fixing the free play of signifiers – fixing the free
play of meanings.
Yet, fixing the free play of
signifiers is not only in the realm of using words and concepts. Fixing is more
immanent in making concepts especially those that define reality. This brings us to the concept of Derrida
about the center.
The Center
When we write an essay or deliver a
speech we always have a theme, a thesis. This theme guides us throughout our writing
or speech. What is interesting is that most of us are not aware that this theme
is what controls the content of our discourse. We choose the appropriate words,
and we structure it in a way that would lead our readers or listeners to
understand our theme. Thus, we fix the structure and the free play of
signifiers. This applies to all discourses – conversations, meetings, school
classes, debates, and many others. Now, this “theme” is what Derrida calls the
“center”.
The structure – or rather the structurality of structure has always
been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or
referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin…The function of this center
is not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure…but above all to
make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we
might call the free play of the structure (1978, p.278).
What is true among discourses is also true among philosophers.
Plato, for example, has a center in his philosophy. The same also goes with
Aristotle, Descartes, Kierkegaard and even with Derrida himself. In fact, it is
impossible to be a philosopher with no center.
However, this is not only what
center means. Derrida goes beyond the thematic concept of a center, and points
out to what is more crucial in the history of philosophy. What he pays
attention is the western culture’s idea of the center which is considered to be
the origin – a fixed point – the absolute source of truth.
All the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to
the center I have always designated the constant of a presence – eidos,
arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia
[truth], transcendentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man, and so
forth (Derrida, 1978 p.279).
For example, the center in the
ancient time is the cosmos (geocentric), in the medieval era is God
(theocratic), and in the modern period is the human person (anthropocentric).
These centers in the history of philosophy, says Derrida (1978, p.278) is what “governs
the structure of language”. Hence, the center in the structure of language in
each era fixes the free play of meanings in the structure.
“the concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of
a free play based on a fundamental ground, a free play which is constituted
upon a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself
beyond the reach of the free play.” (Derrida, 1978, p. 278).
Derrida stresses that what makes the
center seems to be necessary in those previous eras is because of the human
beings’ need to have, if not absolute,
coherent and ascertained conception of reality. “With this certitude anxiety
can be mastered, for anxiety is invariably the result of a certain mode of
being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were
from the very beginning at stake in the game” (Derrida, 1978, p. 279). We
notice that postmodern era has no center like those in the previous eras because
postmodern philosophers refuse to give absolute conception of reality and
instead contend themselves with micronarratives which are propositions that do
not claim absolute validity.
Derrida, however, sees a grave
problem with these centers. These centers tend to claim the absolute meaning.
The reader might not know yet how grave it is, but it is worth mentioning that “knowing
the absolute meaning” is presumptive and repressive. Why is this so? For
example, if I am the person who uses words that have absolute meaning, then it
must entail that all I say is correct. Thus, I do not need to entertain anymore
what other people are “babbling” about because they may be nonsense. What’s the
use of hearing them when I have the absolute meaning?
However, is it possible to use
words that have absolute meaning? Let us go back to the analogy of the four
blind men and the elephant. It has been apprehended that the four blind men
touch the same word, yet they have different connotation about it. Hence, they
only touch one of the multiple parts (meanings) of the elephant (word). What is
the danger is when they begin to impose the meaning to other blind men. How
could they do that when in fact they only touch one part of the word? How can
they claim to have explained the whole if in fact they only touch the part of
it? Let us have this proposition for example:
“The elephant is a throne.”
Let
us suppose that a person would want others to believe this proposition. The
structure of the proposition would tell us that it only entertains one
particular meaning out of the multiple meanings that the words posses. However,
the proposition has the tendency to convey that “this is and no more.” If this is
the case, the person who would impose this proposition would contradict herself.
Even the proposition “This paper is white” when imposed to others would be
contradictory because in the first place that is just one meaning. There are
many meanings, and when one utters a word she cannot have all the meaning. To
really see how grave the problem is, let us consider this proposition of Karl
Marx (Stumpf & Fieser, 2008):
“The only reality is the material.”
Marx wants to impose this as a
proposition which claims absolute validity. This would not be an issue if Marx
uses language that has absolute meaning. However, in the light of Derrida,
there can never be that language. Even the word “language” itself contains
multiple meanings. The meaning of the proposition above tells that it is not
alone. It keeps shouting with such great utterance: “I am not alone; we are
many, but my user wants me alone!” Language, then, “bears within itself the necessity of its own
critique” (Derrida, 1978, p.283).
This further brings us to Derrida’s
famous contribution to philosophy – the deconstruction.
The
Deconstruction
According to Derrida, “we have no
access to reality except through concepts, codes and categories, and the human
mind functions by forming conceptual pairs” (Powell, 1998, p.102). Some of
these conceptual pairs are: nature/culture, matter/form, being/becoming,
existence/essence, science/myth, and truth/error. The structure of language
system, accordingly, is expressed by these opposites. These are also binary
opposites that are more culturally and socially based such as: German/Jew,
Male/Female, Caucasian/Black, Eurocentrism/Afrocentrism, and many more. Binary
opposites are crucial concepts because these provide human beings their bearings
about reality and knowledge, and it would eventually affect human behaviors.
Now with the problem
of centers, we do not usually choose both oppositions because it would be
contradictory. Somehow, we tend to glorify one of the binary opposites, and by
glorifying it we attempt to exclude and repress the other (Powell, 1998,
p.101). In the scientific community, for example, scientists tend to value
signs that pertain to science than to myths, making mythical words meaningless
and remote. In the modern period where most intellectuals focus on reason than
passion, modern people give more value to concepts that discuss reason than to
concepts that express feelings. It seems then that by privileging one of the
opposites, human beings tolerate the rampant political act of marginalization.
The different cultural orientations pave the way for different world views and
perspectives. It is quite alarming that one perspective tends to claim the
authority of truth. In a Christian community, perspectives are centered on the
truth of Christianity, and some other perspectives like that of the Muslims are
relatively abandoned and sometimes treated as meaningless. This becomes
possible because of the assumption that language holds a stable and absolute meaning.
The task of deconstruction is to show that this assumption cannot sustain
itself and that the center cannot hold.
Defining
deconstruction is an activity that goes against the whole thrust of Derrida’s
philosophy (Powell, 1998, p. 100). Any proposition such as “Deconstructions is
P” actually misses the point. Deconstruction is not a concept (although it
seems to be) but a way of reading – “to read the philosophers in a certain way”
(Derrida, 1978, p. 288). Although Derrida was targeting authoritarian
propositions of philosophers, his disciples today use this approach in the
different fields of knowledge and inquiry. Derrida’s deconstructive approach is
always in the context of what he is targeting. Hence we cannot point to any of
his book that explicitly discusses the deconstructive approach. We have access,
nonetheless, from the archives of Yale University, the home of
deconstructionism.
Deconstruction
generally operates upon binary opposites where it looks for the way in which
one term has been “privileged” over the other in a particular text. There are
many ways to deconstruct a text depending upon the context to which it would
apply (Balkin, 1995). In the opposition A/B for example, we can explore the
reason of privileging A over B and how the reason for B’s subordinate status
apply to A in unexpected ways. We may also consider how A depends upon B. The
goal of these exercises is to achieve a new understanding of the relationship
between A and B, which to be sure, is always subject to further deconstruction.
There is something that deconstruction wants to show more. Balkin (1995)
states:
Deconstruction tends to show that conceptual oppositions can be
reinterpreted as form of a nested opposition. A nested opposition is an
opposition in which two terms bear a relationship of conceptual dependence of
similarity as well as conceptual difference or distinction.
For example, in the opposition good/evil, master/slave, and
male/female, the deconstructor would try to look at how one term realizes its
meaning because of the other term. There is the term “good” because there is
also the term “evil”, “master” because there is “slave”, “male” because there
is “female”.
To understand better
the deconstructive approach. Let us deconstruct a proposition ourselves. Let us
have this proposition:
“Man is rational.”
At first, we only see
one possibility, and that is “man as a being endowed with reason”. However,
when we try to look what are hidden,
we may see many possibilities. For example, we may notice that this proposition
tends to privilege male over female. The word “man” in this context is supposed
to mean “human beings”. However, the word “man” may also mean male human beings
alone. Another possibility is that the proposition tends to privilege reason
over appetite. It assumes that man is rational and not appetitive. Still
another is the possibility that the proposition tends to privilege affirmation
over negation. It tends to assume that man is rational but not irrational.
The reader might be
puzzled why we are doing this. Nevertheless, what deconstruction wants to show
is that texts have multiple meanings; and, these meanings are sometimes
overflowing and conflicting (Balkin, 1995). There are many different ways to
understand texts because there are many different contexts that these texts can
be applied. Thus it is impossible to arrest reality by our language.
Implication and Assessment
We have come to the end of
the discussion about Jacques Derrida’s notion on language. As a review, the author
has pointed out that language, for Derrida, is overflowing with meanings. Words
are used in different contexts, and so can connote different meanings. When we
try to define something, Derrida wants to remind us to be careful because we
are only assuming one particular meaning out of the multiple meanings. This is
also true when we try to define reality. We see reality in many different ways
and contexts, and it is very hard and problematic if we try to claim authority about
reality. The attitude that Derrida wants us to have is to be opened and to let
our ‘realities’ be open-ended. When we do this, we do not only open ourselves
but we also let others discover our ‘realities’. It is in this way that we come
into a healthy communion with others regardless of culture, tradition, and
personalities.
There are also many implications
with regard to his bearing on language. We discuss them shortly.
Nothing exists outside our
mind
Derrida denies
the connection of language to the outside world. Language, accordingly, is a
separate entity from the things around us. We can see here the parallelism
between Hegel and Derrida. For Hegel, when we think of something it is the
thought that is conscious of itself. In Derrida’s language, when we are conscious
of something it is language that is conscious of itself. Derrida even put it to
the extent that “there is nothing outside the text” (1967, p.163). This means
that what lies outside our mind is unknowable. If it is unknowable, then there
is no way we can assert that something exists outside our mind. This has opened
us the dark road leading towards a strong skepticism.
One interesting
counter argument against this skepticism is about the notion of Edmund Husserl regarding
the object of intentionality or the object of knowledge (Dy, 2001).
Accordingly, if we know something there must be something which is the object
of this knowledge. We can relate this to words that ‘refer’ to actual things.
For example, when Peter saw what the child wanted him to see, he conceived it
as a chair. However, we should ask: “What causes Peter to conceive something as
a chair?” We are then lead to the independent existence of the things outside
our minds. What causes us to conceive and to understand ‘meaning’ is the very
existence of the thing-in-itself; and this is the object of the meaning we conceive. Hence, we cannot just undermine
the existence of things outside our mind just because we cannot conceive
something outside language. What cause language to ‘refer’ to the actual things
are the actual things themselves.
Understanding between
persons
Derrida posits
that in order to assume a particular meaning, the user of the word fixes the
free play of signifiers. This, however, is only in context of the user. The
problem arises in the context of listeners or readers. Even though the user
assumes a particular meaning, this does not guarantee that listeners and
readers understand the particular meaning the user wants to convey. Thenceforth,
there is no assurance that we understand
each other. Derrida sees this problem as inevitable. In fact he finds it hard
how to make his audience and readers avoid misinterpreting his philosophy.
As social beings,
it is perhaps a prerequisite for us to have a good communication with others.
If the words we use have no precise meanings, it would be very difficult for us
to understand each other. Somehow, we find it hard to believe this position. If
this is true, then why are we able to understand each other despite our
individual differences? Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning this possibility.
If this is the
case, one solution we can find is a refrain of judgment. Since we cannot assure
ourselves to understand each other, we better not judge. In the context of
written words, Derrida, himself, suggests that there is no final
interpretation. A text is written within a context, but there is less assurance
that interpreting it would have also the same context as that within which it
is written. How then can we understand a text? We must be careful with the word
understand here because it is
doubtful if we understand at all. Nevertheless, the right attitude in reading a
text is not to claim an absolute understanding of it. This is the reason why
there is always an avenue for knowing.
Deconstruction and its
skeptical consequence
Another leading
problem that can be posed upon Derrida is the skeptical consequence brought
about by deconstructionism. Deconstruction has been primarily considered as an
attack to totalizing propositions. However, deconstruction can be brought to
its extent: skepticism. Since no proposition holds the absolute meaning,
skeptics would have a rightful place in the stage of intellectual guise. To
refuse any belief would then be justified.
However, it is
still impossible that to refuse any belief conveys the notion that one does not
believe anything. In fact, a refusal to believe anything is itself a belief.
This belief, like all other beliefs, is always subject for deconstruction. Thus,
the skeptics cannot impose that all propositions must be doubted because the
moment they do, they already violate their own standard. We can find here an inner closure, an attitude that
deconstruction is very hostile about.
Openness and humility
We have different
ways of looking at the world because each of us is unique. The world appears to
us in many different angles and contexts. Still the world is there and always
at the disposition in showing us many more meanings. Because of this, there is
so much to learn about the world and ourselves. What is required then is for us
to be open and to empty ourselves in order to let the flow of meanings enter
our deep existential spirit.
Derrida wants us to realize
that there is no belief in this world that is absolute. However, the
impossibility for the absolute must not be the reason why we should stop
learning. Rather, it must become the motivation for us to go on. It is true
that we cannot know absolutely but this does not mean that the Absolute meaning
does not exist. In fact, it is the Absolute meaning which is the very source of
this inexhaustible reality. By learning, we participate in this reality.
Perhaps what is the danger in today’s context
is to compare our learnings with others. Because of this, we tend to label each
other according to the knowledge each of us possesses. Educated individuals
have this tendency to feel superior to those uneducated ones. What is worse is
when we find in our society educated people who are those who oppress and
repress others. This, however, is not the right attitude towards learning. In
the light of Derrida, it is presumptive of knowledge.
When we use
knowledge as power over others, we only give birth for our own destruction.
Knowledge, if pursued in its utility, is nothing but a presumption that all
there is to know are those things that can enable us to manipulate others. In
this sense, we enclose and allure ourselves into believing that our belief is
better than others.
The right
attitude therefore towards learning is to be humble of learning. It is an
acceptance that one does not know all. With this comes the desire to learn many
things. Learning, then, never stops.
Caring about reality
Reality is the very
source of our caring. It is that which makes us conscientious of our bearings
about at the world. Before the discussion, too much emphasis has been given
about the certitude of our worldviews. However, as we move on we have learned
that all of us have different ways of looking at the world. We cannot therefore
say that there is a right way of looking at reality because each of us is
unique. Because of this, there is no need for us to compare ourselves with
others. What would make us conscientious about our caring is not because we have
the absolute knowledge but because we participate in the meaningfulness of the
reality.
This does not mean
however, that all of our beliefs are right. We do not have the freedom to
exercise all our beliefs because we are living in a society where peace and
order are essential. When our freedom ends, the freedom of others begin. There must
then a sense of respect towards the beliefs of others and to their own ways of
caring. This is perhaps evident in the way the Church engages in interreligious
dialogue.
At the onset, the
researcher has realized that when we care about reality, it is not because we
want to have the right view of
reality but because we want to have an authentic way of responding to the
meaningfulness of reality. When something is real, it is not because we make it
real but because we respond to its richness of being real. When God is real, it
is not because we make God real but because we participate in the richness of
the reality of God. Indeed, reality is mystery, but by participating in this
mystery we slowly come to discover that it is not something we grasp but
something we live. This is the reason why we ever care.
Summary, Conclusion and
Recommendation
We begin this
topic by stimulating ourselves by this enduring question: “Can we claim
authority over knowledge?” Jacques Derrida, a post-structuralist and
deconstructionist, is doubtful that somebody can have absolute knowledge. To answer
his problem, he synthesizes structuralism’s linguistic theory that a word is
only meaningful because of other words. This is the reason why a word cannot
sustain itself and can have multiple meanings. In a sense, a word mirrors the
entire language system. Language then, for Derrida, is indeed metaphorical – so
rich of meanings. This is the reason why we cannot have a definite and absolute
conception of reality. We only grasp ideas because of language, and language is
overflowing with meanings. If we have propositions that give absolute
conception of reality, it is necessarily self-destructive since it tends to
make language absolute when in fact it is not. Because of this, Derrida
introduces his deconstructive approach to authoritarian propositions in order
to show their baseless and futile assumptions. From this he maintains that
there cannot be an absolute conception of reality.
The researcher
has drawn many implications in the Derrida’s philosophy. Nevertheless, the
researcher concludes that Derrida’s notion on language has a good impact
especially in our venture towards learning. His bearing on language conveys an
attitude of openness. We do not have the absolute truth and so we do not have
the right to
impose upon others our concept of reality. We are unique because we
have different ways of seeing the world. Therefore, even a simple farmer or a
beggar is not someone who must be looked down just because we see him as less
knowledgeable. We do not have the right to that. In fact, to do such a thing
implies that we treat ourselves as more knowledgeable than others, and so we
tend to claim authority over knowledge. This is a wrong attitude.
Derrida wants to
tell us that there is more to know about reality. If we claim to have known
reality already, then there is no sense of learning still. Only when we begin
to accept that we are beings that are incapable of understanding the whole of
reality can we begin also to respect the beliefs of others. This attitude of
openness and respect can enable us to live in a healthy communion with others.
Moreover, with this acceptance comes our never ending endeavor for learning. By
trying to understand the richness of reality, we do not only come to understand
it, but we also come participate in its richness. What a beautiful world indeed
if we have this attitude.
The task of
philosophy therefore is not to limit itself by the chain of ignorance and
presumption. Rather, it must free itself by an unending desire to know. It must
go outside the box and see reality in the wider horizon. After all, understanding
is not something that alienates life, but something that nurtures life.
Throughout the
paper, the author also encounters some problems that need a different research.
They would be a good avenue of new studies and more learning especially for
philosophy students. One problem encountered is about the ground for morality:
“How can we ground morality if we have different ways of looking at the world?”
This is in- lined with the pushing through of RH Bill in the Philippines. Another problem is of legal nature. Our laws
today are necessarily written which implies fixing the free play of meanings.
However this problem persists: “If we base our political judgments based on our
laws, are we not presuming absolute basis?” Still another problem is about
epistemology. We have discussed that the mind and the world are two different
dimensions. However, even if we assert that the things outside our minds truly exist,
we still cannot assure if our minds conceive the world as it really is. This is
a more serious problem which requires a tedious research. With this
recommendation, the author hopes to open the road for much learning to come.
Derrida is highly
regarded by many as the Socrates of the twentieth century. He also roars the
same cry of that great sage: “To accept that one does not know anything is the
beginning of knowledge.”
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